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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SHERMAN L. RICHENS,
Case No. 900041-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief,
Driver License Services,
Department of Public Safety,
State of Utah,

:
Category No. 14(b)

Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah R. App. P. 3
and 4 (1990).

The final order having been entered by the court

below and no further claims remaining to be determined,
plaintiff/appellant exercised his right to appeal to this court.
This is an appeal by plaintiff, Sherman L. Richens,
from a decision after a trial de novo in the Eighth Judicial
District Court denying his petition and sustaining the Order of
Revocation by the Department of Public Safety, Drivers License
Division (hereinafter "Department") entered by the Court on its
own motion by minute entry dated October 18, 1989. A signed
Order was entered November 6, 1989, pursuant to Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law previously signed by the Court on August
28, 1989.

Richens' claim of insufficient due process implicates
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Utah
Constitution and the due process clause of the United States
Constitution as applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the notice given to a person suspected of

driving while under the influence of alcohol fairly apprises the
person of the duty under the implied consent statute and the
consequences for refusing to submit to a requested chemical test.
2.

Whether the evidence adduced at trial established

by a preponderance that the refusal was knowing and voluntary
thereby justifying the affirmance of the administrative
revocation.
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings are
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard established by Utah
R. Civ. P. 52(a); conclusions of law are reviewed under a
correctness of decision standard,

Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138,

139 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), T.R.F. v. Felan# 760 P.2d 906, 909
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780
(Utah 1986); barring a misapplication of law or findings clearly
unsupported by the evidence, the trial court's determination is
accorded due deference.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following determinative statutes and constitutional
provisions are reproduced in the Addendum:
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-701 et seq. (Supp. 1989)
Utah Code Ann- § 41-6-44 (1988 replacement)
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1988 replacement)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989 replacement)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1989)
U.S. Const, amend. V
U.S. Const, amend. XIV
Utah Const, art. I, § 7
Utah Const, art. I, § 24
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
This is an appeal by appellant Richens based upon a
constitutional challenge to the-notice given a driver arrested
for driving under the influence relative to the request for
submission to a chemical test.

Richens requested and received an

administrative hearing to determine whether or not his privilege
to drive should be revoked.

At the conclusion of the

administrative hearing, the recommendation to revoke was ordered.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989 replacement) and
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1)(d)(ii) (1988 replacement) Richens
obtained a trial de novo in district court. At the conclusion of
trial, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Richens' arrest was upon reasonable grounds, that he was properly
requested to submit to a chemical test pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 41-6-44.10 (1988 replacement) and that Richens was reasonably
warned and admonished as to consequences upon his refusal to
submit to the requested test.
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In light of its findings, the court concluded that
Richens, being under arrest and being reasonably requested to
submit to a chemical test, did refuse the test and, after being
warned as to the consequences for his refusal, did not
immediately request that the test be administered pursuant to the
officer's request.

The court ordered that the Department's

revocation be sustained (R. 45-46).
Richens appeals the trial court's decision alleging the
warning for refusal is constitutionally deficient.

The facts

established in the proceedings below which are relevant to review
of the issue here before the court are as follows:
(1) The case was tried upon uncontroverted
sworn testimony and admitted exhibit one of
defendant. Upon stipulated facts the court
found the peace officer had reason to
approach and question Richens concerning an
observed violation. Also stipulated were the
facts establishing the reasonable grounds for
belief by the arresting officer that Richens
had been driving while under the influence of
alcohol and was arrested for driving under
the influence (R. 33-34; T. 54-58).
(2) Richens was informed he was under arrest
for driving while under the influence of
alcohol; Richens responded that he did
understand that by stating "yup." (Def.
Exhibit § X, T. 60).
(3) Trooper Gustin testified that he
requested Richens to take a breath test (Def.

References to the transcript of the trial de novo held before
the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, Eighth District Court, Uintah
County, shall be designated by the letter "T". References to
portions of the record before the Utah Court of Appeals shall be
designated by the letter "R".
o
The DUI Summons and Citation and DUI Report Form admitted into
evidence at trial are marked by the district court as Defendant's
Exhibit 1 and are enclosed in a manila envelope which is included
with the court's record; however, they are not paginated.
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Exhibit S X, T. 61).
(4) Trooper Gustin testified that Richens'
response was "nope, blood test only." (Def.
Exhibit § Xf T. 61)•
(5) Trooper Gustin testified he then read
the first admonition and recorded Richens'
response as, "my request is that I want my
doctor here to pull it. Blood test only."
(Def. Exhibit § X, T. 61).
The first admonition reads as follows:
Results indicating .08% or more by
weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and
the existence of a blood alcohol content or
presence of drugs sufficient to render you
incapable of safely driving a vehicle may,
result in suspension or revocation of your
license or privilege to operate a motor
vehicle.
(6) Trooper Gustin testified he then read
the second admonition to which Richens
responded, "I want a blood test only." (Def.
Exhibit § X, T. 62).
The second admonition reads as follows:
If you refuse the test, it will not be
given, however I must warn you that if you
refuse, your license or permit to drive a
motor vehicle may be revoked for one year
with no provision for a limited driver's
license. After you have taken this test, you
will be permitted to have a physician of your
own choice administer a test at your own
expense, in addition to the one I have
requested you to submit to, so long as it
does not delay the test or tests requested by
me. Upon your request, I will make available
to you the results of the test if you take
it.
(7) Trooper Gustin testified that at no time
did he offer or request a blood test; that
Richens responded to each of the requests to
take a breath test with in essence, no, I
want a blood test only (Def. Exhibit § X, T.
61-63).
(8) Trooper Gustin testified that nothing
occurred nor was said which would cause him
-5-

to objectively believe Richens was confused
about or misunderstood the request for the
chemical test by breath (T. 67).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The privilege to drive, while an important interest
once granted, is not a fundamental interest.

The privilege is

conditioned upon observance of applicable laws.

When the

privilege to drive is subject to suspension or revocation action,
due process requires that notice of such action be given.
A due process analysis requires only that the notice
given be calculated to fairly apprise the person of the nature
and consequences of the action.

At a subsequent time, a

meaningful hearing appropriate to the nature of the competing
private and public interests shall be afforded.
not challenge the hearing provided.

This appeal does

Richens' challenge complains

of a lack of clarity in the notice given pursuant to the implied
consent statute.

In response, the wording is not vague; neither

must it be perfect.

Due process is satisfied when a person of

reasonable intelligence would understand the admonitions
explaining the rights and duties under the statute.
Richens also claims Utah's statute offends equal
protection of laws.

Inasmuch as the interest in obtaining and

maintaining a license to drive is not a fundamental right, the
statute will withstand a constitutional challenge if a rational
basis exists for the law.

The Department's position is that the

legitimate public purpose of protecting and promoting public
health, safety and welfare justifies the law.

Nor does the fact

that different language is used in a similar provision in the
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commercial driver license law cause the implied consent statute
to fail a constitutional challenge.
se unconstitutional.

Classifications are not per

If a set of facts can be reasonably

conceived to justify the distinctions, the classification is
legitimate.

That is the case involved in the present appeal.

Finally, the trial court below found by a preponderance
of the evidence that:

(1) the arresting officer had reasonable

grounds to believe Richens had been driving a vehicle in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 in that Richens' response
was slow to the peace officer's signal to pull over, lane travel
was improper, a chain was being dragged, Richens emanated an odor
of alcohol and exhibited poor balance and watery, reddish eyes,
Richens could not perform any field sobriety tests correctly, and
Richens admitted to having consumed alcohol; (2) the warnings
given to Richens were understandable by any reasonable person and
did adequately advise Richens of the duties and consequences
accompanying the request to submit to a chemical test, (3) the
second sentence of the second admonition advised Richens that
additional tests of his choice may be taken "in addition to the
one" requested by the peace officer, (4) the second admonition
would be reasonably understood and was given to Richens, (5)
Richens did voluntarily and knowingly refuse by his acts and
actions after being warned of the consequences for refusing.
This set of facts supported the trial court's decision affirming
the revocation (R. 33-35).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE NOTICE RELATIVE TO REQUIRED SUBMISSION TO
CHEMICAL TEST(S) WHICH IS GIVEN TO A PERSON
ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL SATISFIES CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS IN THAT THE INFORMATION CONVEYED
IS NOT SO VAGUE AS TO FAIL TO FAIRLY APPRISE
THE PERSON OF THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE ACTION.
The thrust of Richens' argument stems from the issue
raised at trial, namely, the specificity of the second admonition
(T. 65-66) wherein the officer has the statutory discretion to
choose which of the authorized tests and how many will be
administered. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1)(b) and (c) (1988
replacement).

Richens argues that the specificity of the

admonition throws the determination of refusal into doubt;
specifically, did Richens refuse.

From this reasoning, Richens

now claims the procedure surrounding chemical tests to determine
alcohol concentration violates due process, specifically the
notice is insufficient.
The courts of this state have repeatedly and with great
clarity noted that the privilege to drive in this state cannot be
taken back without procedural due process.

Ballard v. State,

Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979); Holman v. Cox,
598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979).

The Department does not take

exception to this status. As a starting point, it must be noted,
however, that legislative enactments are presumed constitutional.
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987).

Following on the

heels of this presumption, the challenger to a statute carries
the heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
-8-

statute is unconstitutional.
(Colo. 1988).

People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916

Statutory construction is fairly settled in

according legislative enactments presumed validity.

If any

reasonable construction consistent with validity can be given,
such interpretation should be adopted.
possible; courts recognize this.

Absolute precision is not

Additionally, statutes are

written so as to apply to varied factual circumstances.

This

limited generality does not do violence to due process.

See

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah 1983) for a
succinct statement of statutory construction; see also People v.
McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 918, 920 (Colo. 1988), a penal statute
must be sufficiently clear; statutory construction presumes
constitutionality without requiring precise definitions
recognizing the necessity of limited flexibility in language; and
see People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 771 (Colo. 1988) not only
are statutes presumed constitutional, a fair description
permitting common understanding will not be found
unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable interpretation can be
made which comports with the statutory intent; further, statutes
must be drafted to permit application to varying circumstances
and times.
Richens' claim of lack of specificity lends itself to
constitutional vagueness analysis.

Therefore, if the implied

consent statute is sufficiently precise and if the standards of
application are particularized to avoid arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement by police officers, then the challenge
should fail.

The first step in this analysis requires reading
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the language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1988 replacement).
Most important to note is that anyone "operating a motor vehicle
in this state is considered to have given . . . consent to a
chemical test or tests. . . . " Id!. § 41-6-44.10(1) (a) . This
section has long been found consistent with due process
requirements.

Ballard/ 595 P.2d at 1305.

Thus, at the outset we

have a person who knows a chemical test or tests can be
reasonably requested.

The only requirement the police officer

must meet in this subsection is to act reasonably under the
specific set of circumstances.

Id., at 1305-06.

Proceeding to

the next subsection § 41-6-44.10(1)(b), the only mandatory
language concerns the administration of blood or urine tests.
The Utah Supreme Court had occasion to address this issue in Salt
Lake City v. Womack, 747 P.2d 1039, 1041-42 (Utah 1987).

In that

case, the appellant claimed the implied consent law violated her
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.

The

choice of tests should be hers and not the officers, she claimed,
because of differences in accuracy.

However, no evidence was

presented supporting significant accuracy differences.
found the argument meritless.

The Court

In the instant case, Richens

claims that because the statute permits any of the three types of
chemical test be administered, to protect his constitutional
rights, he must be told the choice is the officer's.

This runs

contrary to the courts' prior decisions which hold that the
statute "should be construed in a fashion to make its application
practicable and to enable an officer to deal realistically with
arrested drivers. . . . "

Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah
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1979).

Requiring an officer to enter into a discussion

explaining choice of test, could create an environment of
confusion and heighten a tense situation into a hostile one.
Assume the officer states the three possible choices; assume a
discussion ensues regarding the relative merits.

Not only is the

discussion pointless, the arrestee is conceivably confused by the
very discussion the court is urged to rule necessary to meet due
process requirements.

The arrestee has been told things which

still do not entitle him to dictate his choice.

The next

paragraph, § 41-6-44.10(1)(c), is still void of any mandatory
language requiring the officer to do any specific act.
Subsection 41-6-44.10(2)(a) does require affirmative
acts of the peace officer.

Upon refusal, the officer shall warn

the person such refusal can result in revocation.

Is this

warning, the complete text of which has been provided above, so
inadequate as to be unconstitutional.

In Pro-Benefit Staffing v.

Board of Review, 771 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this
court addressed the question of adequacy of notice.

Pro-Benefit

asserted the issue was whether it had the status of "employer";
the Department of Employment Security notified Pro-Benefit the
issue to be determined at the scheduled hearing was whether the
leased employees were reportable as employees of Pro-Benefit or
of Pro-Benefit's client.

This court found that "[ajlthough the

words vary slightly, the concepts they express are not so
different as to fail to fairly apprise Pro-Benefit of the nature
and consequences of the controversy." Jd. at 1112. The Utah
Supreme Court also has determined that a statute "need only be as
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definite and certain as the subject matter permits."
Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 1981)-

State v.

In this case the statute

prohibiting driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the circumstances was held not unconstitutionally
vague.

The standards applied encompassed having regard for

actual and potential hazards and commonly accepted assumptions
with respect to vehicles and speed.

Thus, there was sufficient

precision and standards were particular enough to avoid arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.
Additional cases deciding issues close to the issues
before this court are Larson v. Schwendiman 712 P.2d 244, 245
(Utah 1985) and Lee v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah
1986).

In Larson the court concluded that the warning that his

license may be revoked was adequate to apprise Larson of the
rights and duties under the implied consent law and the
consequences of his refusal.

The facts supported the trial

court's decision and that decision was affirmed on appeal.

As

the court noted, Larson had no constitutional privilege to
refuse.

Not having his constitutional rights read to him with

respect to the requirements under the implied consent law was of
no consequence to the validity of the process surrounding the
request to take a chemical test.
instant case.

Lee is applicable to the

In that case, Lee alleged she was "not clearly

informed of the consequence" of refusing to submit to the
chemical test.

Lee, 722 P.2d at 767. The court noted evidence

at trial supported the finding that a test had been requested;
after Lee refused, a warning of consequences was given; applying
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an objective test, Lee appeared to understand.

She understood

the reason for her arrest; she understood potential consequences
to her personal life; and even though she was upset and crying
she appeared coherent.

The court the quoted from Muir v. Cox,

611 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1980), stating "[a]n officer properly
discharges his duty if he gives an explanation that a person of
reasonable intelligence would understand."

In a footnote to a

previously cited case, Womack, 747 P.2d 1042 n.3, the court
dismissed Womack's assertion that prior caselaw required that the
peace officer read the entire implied consent law verbatim.
Womack's reliance on those cases was misplaced, stated the court.
The officer is merely required to apprise persons of their
implied consent and the effect of their refusal.
Richens cites Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P.2d 451 (Utah 1976)
and Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975) for support of
his claim that the statutory warning required is unclear and
therefore inadequate notice.

It must be pointed out that since

Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349, 352 (Utah 1979) (and a 1977
amendment to the statute) a reasonable refusal is precluded.
This condition coupled with the objective standard applied to
apparent comprehension of the implied consent refusal warning
strongly argues against Richens' claim of inadequate notice.

The

uncontroverted facts adduced at trial supported the court's
findings by a preponderance that Richens was reasonably apprised
as to consequences for his refusal and no confusion was
manifested to cause the officer to believe Richens did not
appreciate the warning.

-13-

Engaging in an exercise of what might be good law or
better law or which state conducts the process of admonishing
drivers relative to refusing a requested chemical test with "more
process" can be interesting.
certain truths:

It does not, however, change

different wording does not equate with

inadequate notice to the point of violating due process
protections; "there is no requirement . . . that due process of
law must be the same in all fifty states."
761 P.2d 768, 773 (Colo. 1988).

People v. Stevens,

States are free to create

legislative solutions to problems.

While the problems may be the

same, the states are not compelled to conform to a single
approach with the attendant procedures which must meet
constitutional minimums.
POINT II
APPLYING A RATIONAL BASIS TEST, THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ADMONITIONS GIVEN TO
DRIVERS WITH OPERATORS LICENSES AND TO
DRIVERS WITH COMMERCIAL LICENSES WITHSTAND AN
EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE.
Legislative classifications are not offensive if some
reasonable basis exists to justify the distinctions.

If any

state of facts reasonably can be conceived which would sustain
the differences, that is sufficient; nor is exactitude required.
Any challenge to classifications must show no rational nexus
exists between the statute and a legitimate public purpose.

See

Utah Public Employees' Association v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 127374 (Utah 1980) and Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 243-44 (Utah
1979) wherein the court describes and illustrates the rational
basis test as applied to nonfundamental private interests.
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The

privilege to drive a motor vehicle, whether a private automobile
or a commercial vehicle, is not a fundamental right.
Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1987).

City of

Therefore, a

strict scrutiny analysis does not apply and a classification
which is not arbitrary will withstand a constitutional attack.
Richens' claims that the admonitions must be the same ignores the
factual differences.

First, the enactment by the Utah

Legislature of the federal commercial driver license act was
pursuant to the federal supremacy in the field of commercial
interstate commerce. Inasmuch as more strict requirements and
disqualifying factors are incorporated in the Commercial Driver
License Act, stricter warnings could be deemed more necessary.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-702 (Supp. 1989).

Next, a reasonable basis

exists for treating commercial drivers differently.

The number

of miles driven, the types of cargo transported, the
responsibility for passengers all support any differences in
statutes.
The differences in wording of which Richens complains
are without controlling import for two general reasons.

One, the

admonitions "fairly apprise" persons of their duty under the law
and the consequences for refusing to submit to a reasonably
requested chemical test.

Two, the distinctions are not arbitrary

since facts can be reasonably conceived which justify
differences.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT TAKING UNCONTROVERTED
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL DE NOVO
BELOW WAS IN THE BEST POSITION TO ASSESS THE
WITNESS'S CREDIBILITY; BARRING A CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS DECISION, THAT RULING SHOULD NOT BE
DISTURBED.
The trial was conducted before the trial judge alone.
While certain portions of the case were submitted to the judge on
stipulated facts, the issue to be decided was not submitted on
stipulation.

Thus, the clearly erroneous standard applies.

Barker v. Franics, 741 P.2d 548, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), State
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); see Sacramento Baseball
Club, Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1059-60
(Utah 1987) for a different standard of review, correctness of
decision, if the trial court had made its decision based upon
stipulated facts.
This court, reviewing the record before it must be
firmly convinced that the decision below was a clear mistake
before overturning the decision.

Trooper Gustin testified that

he asked Richens if he understood he was under arrest for driving
under the influence; the response was affirmative.

Trooper

Gustin testified that he asked Richens to take a breath test.
Richens responded "nope, blood test only."

Trooper Gustin

testified he then read the first admonition (which has been cited
above) and requested again that Richens take a breath test.

The

officer testified that Richens stated "my request is that I want
my doctor here to pull a blood test only."

The officer then read

the second admonition (reproduced above) which warns of the
consequences of refusal.

Richens was warned that refusing the
-16-

test could result in revocation of his license. Richens'
response was "he wanted a blood test only."

Testimony was also

elicited establishing that Richens did not manifest any confusion
regarding the officer's request that he, Richens, had been asked
to take a breath test.

(References are to the transcript and

record previously cited above in the Statement of Facts.)
The trial court had uncontroverted evidence of a
voluntary refusal.

Applying a preponderance of evidence

standard, the court found that the driver had refused.

If

Richens' argument is accepted, the implied consent statute would
be effectively emasculated.

Utah courts have uniformly held that

the statute must be construed to permit an officer to
realistically enforce the law.

Imposing technical actions on an

officer working in varied environments and dealing with the full
spectrum of humanity is not practicable nor likely to improve the
enforcement of this law.

Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736,

739 (Utah 1984), Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P.2d 280, 282 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

The dissent in Conrad correctly notes the

officer was not required to do more than he did.

The driver's

confidence in one test versus another was not argued nor
supported by evidence and his offer to take a blood test is
clearly not responsive to the officer's request to take a breath
test.

The majority in Conrad recognized the necessity for

practicality:

Did the driver refuse the requested test. Arguing

by analogy, is not the counter-offer to submit to a different
test just another way to equivocate and condition one's response
to the officer's request.

Cases uniformly hold that an express
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refusal is not required; actions and conditional consent are
equivalent refusals.

See Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979);

(numerous cases subsequent to Beck cite and follow its reasoning;
See Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d at 738-39, additional
citations omitted).
Evidence presented at trial establish a voluntary,
knowing refusal by a preponderance.

Therefore, the decision is

not vulnerable to a "clearly erroneous" reversal.

The

alternative review entails a determination of whether the trial
court misapplied the law.
turns on the set of facts.

Whether a refusal occurred or not
The record before this court contains

the facts presented at trial and the findings and conclusions
therefrom.

Numerous cases, some cited above, have interpreted

the facts required to find a refusal.

The court below has not

deviated from those decisions.
CONCLUSION
This case just as others, turns on its facts.

Without

intending to belabor the facts, the transcript and record before
this court establish clearly the basis for finding a knowing,
voluntary refusal.

Trooper Gustin responded reasonably under the

circumstances by reading verbatim the duty imposed by the implied
consent law and the consequences for refusal.

Nothing overtly

occurred to alert the officer to any confusion.
Not only are the facts uncontroverted and supportive of
the decision, the statute itself is not unconstitutional under
any analysis urged by Richens.

Notice given was adequate to

fairly apprise Richens of the duty and consequences.

-18-

Sufficient

notice need not be perfect, just reasonably calculated to apprise
one of the controversy.
The trial court's ruling was entirely consistent with
the uncontroverted factual testimony.

This court should affirm

the ruling below.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

PART 7
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL DRIVER
LICENSE ACT
41-2-701. Short title.
This part is known as the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act
History C 1953* 41-2*701, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 290, ft 21.
ft

Effective Dates — Laws 1989 ch 290
41 makes the act effective on July 1 1969

41-2-702. Legislative intent.
(1) The legislative purpose of this part is to implement Title XII of Public
Law 99-570, the Federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, and to
reduce or prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and injuries
by
(a) permitting commercial operators of motor vehicles to hold only one
commercial driver license,
(b) lowering the alcohol concentration level at which a commercial operator is disqualified,
(c) disqualifying commercial operators uppn conviction of certain criminal offenses and serious traffic-related offenses, and
(d) strengthening licensing and testing standards for commercial vehicle operator licenses
(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that this part is remedial and shall be
liberally construed to promote the public health, safety, and welfare
(3) This part supersedes the general licensing provisions of state law
History* C 1953, 41-2-702, enacted b> L.
1989, ch 290, ft 22

Effective Dates — Laws 1989 ch 290
§ 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989

41-2-703. Definitions.
As used in this part
(1) "Alcohol" means any substance containing any form of alcohol, including but not limited to ethanol, methanol, propanol, and isopropanol
(2) "Alcohol concentration" means the number of grams of alcohol per
(a) one hundred milliliters of blood,
(b) 210 liters of breath, or
(c) 67 milliliters of unne
(3) "Commercial dnver license (CDL)" means a license issued to an
individual in accordance with the requirements of the CMVSA-86, that
authorizes the holder to operate a specified class of commercial motor
vehicle
(4) "Commercial driver license information system (CDLIS)" means
the information system established under CMVSA-86 as a clearinghouse
for information related to the licensing and identification of commercial
motor vehicle operators
(5) "Commercial driver instruction permit (CDIP)" means a permit issued under Section 41-2-708
(6) "Commercial motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle designed or
used to transport passengers or property, that
(a) has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds or a
lesser rating as determined by federal regulation,
(b) is designed to transport more than 15 passengers, including the
dnver, or
(c) is used for transporting hazardous materials and is required to
be placarded in accordance with 49 C F R , Part 172, Subpart F
(7) "Controlled substance" means any substance so classified under
Section 102(6) of the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U S C 802(6), and
includes all substances listed on the current Schedules I through V of 21
C F R , Part 1308

(8) "Conviction" means:
(a) an unvacated abjudication of guilt or a determination that a
person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of
original jurisdiction or an administrative proceeding;
(b) an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure
a person's appearance in court;
(c) a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court;
(d) the payment of a fine or court costs; or
(e) violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of
whether the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated.
(9) "Disqualification" means a prohibition against operating a commercial motor vehicle.
(10) "Division" means the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety.
(11) "Drive" means:
(a) to drive, operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle in
any location open to the general public for purposes of vehicular
traffic; and
(b) in Sections 41-2-712 and 41-2-713, the operation or physical
control of a motor vehicle at any place within the state.
(12) "Driver" means any person who drives, operates, or is in physical
control of a commercial motor vehicle in any location open to the general
public for purposes of vehicular traffic or who is required to hold a CDL
under this part or federal law.
(13) "Driver license" means a license issued by a state to an individual,
that authorizes the individual to drive a motor vehicle.
(14) "Employer" means any individual or person including the United
States, a state, or a political subdivision of a state, who owns or leases a
commercial motor vehicle, or assigns an individual to drive a commercial
motor vehicle.
(15) "Felony" means any offense under state or federal law that is
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of more than one year.
(16) "Foreign jurisdiction" means any jurisdiction other than the
United States or a state of the United States.
(17) "Gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR)" means the:
(a) value specified by the manufacturer as the maximum loaded
weight of a single vehicle; or
(b) GVWR of a combination or articulated vehicle, and includes
the GVWR of the power unit plus the total weight of all towed units
and the loads on those units.
(18) "Hazardous material" has the same meaning as defined under
Section 103, 49 App. U.S.C. 1801 et seq., Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.
(19) "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle and every vehicle propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but
not operated upon rails, except motorized wheel chairs and vehicles
moved solely by human power.
(20) "Nonresident CDL" means a commercial driver license issued by a
state to an individual who resides in a foreign jurisdiction.
(21) "Out of service order" means a temporary prohibition against driving a commercial motor vehicle.
(22) "School bus" means every publicly or privately owned motor vehicle designed for transporting ten or more passengers and operated for the
transportation of children to or from school or school activities.
(23) "Serious traffic violation" means:
(a) excessive speeding as defined by the United States Secretary of
Transportation by regulation;
(b) reckless driving as defined by state or local law; or
(c) all other violations under Section 41-2-127 for which mandatory suspension or revocation are required.
(24) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any province or territory of Canada.
(25) "United States" means the 50 states and the District of Columbia.

History: C. 1953, 41-3-703, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 290, f 23

Effective uaies. — &*w» ** c * v » -~ v ,
f 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989

41-2-704. Commercial motor vehicle operator — Only one
license.
(1) Any person who drives a commercial motor vehicle may have no more
than one driver license, except under Subsection (2)
(2) A person who drives a commercial vehicle may have more than one
dnver license
(a) during the ten-day period beginning on the date the person is issued
a driver license, and
(b) until December 31,1989, if a state law enacted on or before June 1,
1986 requires the person to have more than one driver license
History C 1953, 41-2-704, enacted by L.
1989, ch 290, ( 2 4

Effective Dates — Laws 1969 ch 290
§ 41 makes the act effective on July 1 1989

41-2-705. Driving record and other information to be provided to employer.
(1) Any driver of a commercial vehicle who holds a driver license issued b>
this state and is convicted of violating any state or municipal law relating to
motor vehicle traffic control in any other state other than parking violations,
shall notify both the division and his employer in writing of the conviction
within 30 days of the date of conviction
(2) A driver shall notify his employer within 30 days of the day the dnver
receives notice that
(a) his license is suspended, revoked, or canceled by any state,
(b) he loses the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle in an)
state for any period, or
(c) he is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for an>
penod
(3) A person who applies to be a commercial motor vehicle driver shall at
the time of application provide to the employer the following information for
the ten years prior to the date of apphcation
(a) a list of the names and addresses of the applicant's previous employers for which the applicant was a driver of a commercial vehicle as
any part of his employment,
(b) the dates between which the applicant drove for each employer
listed under Subsection (a), and
(c) the reason the applicant's employment with each employer listed
was terminated
(4) (a) An applicant shall certify that all information provided under this
section is true and complete to the best of his knowledge
(b) An employer receiving information under this section may require
that an applicant provide additional information
History C 1953, 41-2-705, enacted by L.
1989, ch 290, ft 25

Effective Dates — Laws 1989, ch 290
§ 41 makes the act effective on July 1 1989

41-2-706. Limitations on employment of commercial motor
vehicle operators.
(1) An employer shall require all applicants for employment as a commercial motor vehicle dnver to provide the information as required in Section
41-2-705
(2) An employer may not knowingly allow, permit, or authorize a driver to
drive a commercial vehicle during any penod when the dnver has
(a) a dnver license that is suspended, revoked, or canceled by any
state,
(b) lost the pnvilege to dnve a commercial motor vehicle m a state,
(c) been disqualified from dnving a commercial motor vehicle, or
(d) more than one dnver license, except under Section 41-2-704

History: C. 1953, 41-2-706, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 290, I 26.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290,
f 41 makes the set effective on July 1, 1989.

41-2-707. Requirements to operate commercial motor vehicle.
( D A person may not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless the person
has been issued and is in immediate possession of:
(a) a CDL valid for the vehicle he is driving; or
(b) a valid CDIP, and is accompanied by a person holding a valid CDL
for the vehicle being driven.
(2) A person may not drive a commercial motor vehicle while his privilege
to drive a commercial motor vehicle is:
(a) suspended, revoked, or canceled;
(b) subject to a disqualification; or
(c) subject to an out-of-service order.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-707, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 290, ft 27.
ft

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290,
41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.

41-2-708. Qualifications for commercial driver license —
Third parties may administer skills test.
(1) A CDL may be issued only to a person who:
(a) is a resident of this state or qualifies as a nonresident under Section
41-2-710;
(b) has passed a test of knowledge and skills for driving a commercial
motor vehicle, that complies with minimum standards established by
federal regulation in 49 C.F.R. Part 383, Subparts G. and H.; and
(c) has complied with all requirements of the CMVSA-86 and other
applicable state laws and federal regulations.
(2) Tests required under this section shall be prescribed and administered
by the division.
(3) The division shall authorize a person, an agency of this or another state,
an employer, a private driver training facility or other private institution, or a
department, agency, or entity of local government to administer the skills test
required under this section if:

41-2-713. CDL classifications, endorsements, and restrictions.
A CDL may be issued with the following classifications, endorsements, and
restrictions:
(1) Classifications:
(a) Class A: any combination of vehicles with a gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR) of 26,001 pounds or more, if the GVWR of the
one or more vehicles being towed is in excess of 10,000 pounds;
(b) Class B: any single vehicle with a GVWR of 26,001 pounds or
more, including that vehicle when towing a vehicle with a GVWR of
10,000 pounds or less; and
(c) Class C: any single vehicle with a GVWR of less than 26,001
pounds or that vehicle when towing a vehicle with a GVWR of 10,000
pounds or less and comprised of vehicles used:
(i) to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver;
(ii) as a school bus, and weighing less than 26,001 pounds
GVWR; or
(iii) in the transporting of hazardous materials that requires
the vehicle to be placarded under 49 C.F.R., Part 172, Subpart F.
(2) Endorsements and restrictions:
(a) WH" authorizes the driver to drive a vehicle transporting hazardous materials.
(b) "I" restricts a driver to intrastate operation of a class A or B

commercial motor vehicle.
(c) TC" restricts the driver to vehicles not equipped with air
brakes.
(d) frSn authorizes driving tank vehicles.
(e) T " authorizes driving vehicles carrying passengers.
(f) "S" authorizes driving of school buses.
(g) *T" authorizes driving double and triple trailers.
(h) "X" represents a combination of hazardous materials and tank
vehicle endorsements.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-713, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 290, § 3 3 .

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290,
§ 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989

41-2-714. Issuance of CDL by division — Driving recordExpiration date — Hazardous materials provision.
(1) Before the division may issue a CDL, the division shall obtain the driving record information regarding the applicant through the CDLIS, the NDR,
and from each state where the applicant has been licensed.
(2) Within ten days after issuing a CDL the division shall notify the CDLIS
and provide all information required to ensure identification of the CDL
holder.
(3) The expiration date for the CDL shall be the birth date of the holder in
the fourth year following the year of issuance of the CDL.
(4) (a) The applicant for a renewal of a CDL shall complete the application
form required by Section 41-2-711 and provide updated information and
required certification.
(b) To retain a hazardous materials endorsement upon CDL renewal,
the applicant must take and pass the written test for hazardous materials
endorsement in addition to any other testing required by the division.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-714, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 290, ft 34.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 290,
M l makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.

41-2-715. CDL disqualification or suspension — Grounds
and duration — Procedure.
(1) A person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a
period of not less than one year if convicted of a first offense of:
(a) driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, a controlled substance, or more than one of these;
(b) driving a commercial motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood, breath, or urine is .04% or more;
(c) leaving the scene of an accident involving a commercial motor vehicle he was driving;
(d) using a commercial motor vehicle in the commission of a felony as
defined in this part;
(e) refusal to submit to a test to determine the concentration of alcohol
in his blood, breath, or urine; or
(f) driving a commercial motor vehicle while the person's commercial
driver license is disqualified, suspended, canceled, or revoked.
(2) If any of the violations under Subsection (1) occur while the driver is
transporting a hazardous material required to be placarded, the driver is
disqualified for not less than three years.
(3) (a) Except under Subsection (4), a driver of a commercial motor vehicle
is disqualified for life if convicted of two or more of any of the offenses
under Subsection (1), or any combination of those offenses arising from
two or more separate incidents.
(b) This subsection applies only to those offenses committed after July
1, 1989.
(4) The division may make rules establishing guidelines and conditions
under which a disqualification for life under Subsection (3) may be reduced by
the division to a period of not less than ten years.

(5) A driver of a commercial motor vehicle is disqualified for life if he uses a
commercial motor vehicle in the commission of any felony involving the manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing of a controlled substance, or possession
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance.
(6) A driver of a commercial motor vehicle is disqualified for not less than
60 days if he is convicted of two serious traffic violations that:
(a) occur within three years of each other;
(b) arise from separate incidents; and
(c) involve the use or operation of a commercial motor vehicle.
(7) (a) The division shall update its records within ten days of suspending,
revoking, or cancelling a CDL to reflect the action taken.
(b) When the division suspends, revokes, or cancels a nonresident CDL,
it shall notify the licensing authority of the issuing state within ten days
after the action is taken.
(8) (a) The division may immediately suspend the CDL of a driver without
hearing or receiving a record of conviction when the division has reason
to believe the license was issued by the division through error orfraud,or
the applicant provided incorrect or incomplete information to the division.
(b) Suspension of a CDL under this subsection shall be in accordance
with Section 41-2-128.
(c) If a hearing is held under this section, the division shall then rescind the suspension order or cancel the license.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-715, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 290, §35.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290,
§ 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989

41-2-716. Measurable alcohol amount consumed — Penalty — Refusal to take test for alcohol.
(1) A person may not drive, operate, or be in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle while there is any measurable or detectable alcohol in his
body.
(2) The division or a law enforcement officer shall place a person out-ofservice for 24 consecutive hours who:
(a) violates Subsection (1); or
(b) refuses a request to submit to a test to determine the alcohol concentration of his blood, breath, or urine.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-716, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 290, I 36.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 290,
M l makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.

41-2-717. Prohibited alcohol level for operators — Procedures, including hearing.
(1) It is unlawful and punishable under Section 41-2-715 for a person to
drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle
in this state if the person:
(a) has a blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration of .04 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged driving, operation, or physical control of the commercial motor
vehicle; or
(b) is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to any degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a commercial motor vehicle.
(2) A person who drives a commercial motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given his consent subject to Section 41-6-44.10 to a test or tests of
his blood, breath, or urine to determine the concentration of alcohol in his
physical system or the presence of other drugs in his physical system.
(3) When a peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person may
be violating this section, the peace officer may request the person to submit to
chemical tests to be administered in compliance with Section 41-6-44.3.

(4) When a peace vm^* . ^ ^
.
section, he shall advise the person that test results indicating .04 grams or
greater alcohol concentration or refusal to submit to any test requested will
result in the person's disqualification under Section 41-2-715 from operating a
commercial motor vehicle.
(5) If test results under this section indicate .04 grams or greater of alcohol
concentration or the person refuses to submit to any test requested under this
section, the officer shall on behalf of the division serve the person with immediate notice of the division's intention to disqualify the person's privilege to
operate a commercial vehicle.
(6) When the officer serves notice under Subsection (5) he shall:
(a) take any Utah license certificate or permit held by the driver;
(b) issue to the driver a temporary license effective for 30 days;
(c) provide the driver, on a form approved by the division, basic information regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the division; and
(d) issue a 24-hour out-of-service order.
(7) A notice of disqualification issued under Subsection (6) may serve also
as the temporary license under that subsection, if the form is approved by the
division.
(8) The peace officer serving the notice of disqualification shall, within five
days after the date of service, send to the division the person's license, a copy
of the served notice, and a report signed by the officer that indicates the
results of any chemical tests administered or that the person refused the tests.
(9) The person has the right to a hearing regarding the disqualification
within 30 days after the notice was issued. The request for the hearing shall
be submitted to the division in writing and shall be made within ten days of
the date the notice was issued.
(10) (a) A hearing held under this section shall be held before the division
and in the county where the notice was issued, unless the division agrees
to hold the hearing in another county.
(b) The hearing shall be documented and shall determine:
(i) whether the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
person had been operating a motor vehicle in violation of this section;
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to any requested tests;
and
(iii) any test results obtained.
(c) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent
may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of
witnesses and the production of relevant books and documents.
(d) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing.
(e) A decision made after a hearing before any number of members of
the division is as valid as if the hearing were held before the full membership of the division.
(f) After a hearing under this section the division shall indicate by
order if the person's CDL is disqualified.
(11) If the division disqualifies a person under this section, the person may
petition for a hearing under Section 41-2-131. The petition shall be filed
within 30 days after the division issues the disqualification.
(12) In accordance with Section 41-2-715, the first disqualification under
this section shall be for one year, and a second disqualification shall be for life.
(13) (a) In addition to the fees imposed under Section 41-2-112 for reinstatement of a CDL, a fee under Section 41-2-103 to cover administrative
costs shall be paid before the driving privilege i6 reinstated.
(b) The fee under Section 41-2-103 shall be canceled if an unappealed
hearing at the division or court level determines the disqualification was
not proper.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-717, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 290, f 37.

Effective Datet. — Laws 19S9, ch 290,
§ 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.

41*2*718. Nonresident operator violations reported to resident state.
When the division receives a report of the conviction of a nonresident holder
of a CDL for a violation of a state law or local ordinance relating to traffic
control, the division shall notify the driver licensing authority in the licensing
state within ten days of receipt of the report. This section does not apply to
parking violations.
Hiftory: C. 1953, 41-2-718, enacted by L.
1989, ch, 290, I 38.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 290,
M l makes the act effective on July 1, 1989

41-2-719. Operator's driving record available for certain
purposes.
The division shall provide full information regarding the driving record of
any holder of a CDL to:
(1) the driver license administrator of any other state requesting that
information;
(2) any employer or prospective employer of a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle upon request and payment of a fee under Section
41-2-103; and
(3) insurers of commercial motor vehicle drivers upon request and payment of a fee under Section 41-2-103.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-719, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 290, § 39.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 290,
M l makes the act effective on July 1, 1989

41-2-720. Authority to drive commercial motor vehicle in
Utah.
(1) A person may drive a commercial motor vehicle in this state if:
(a) the person has a commercial driver license issued by any state or
province or territory of Canada in accordance with the minimum federal
standards for the issuance of commercial motor vehicle driver licenses;
(b) the person'6 license is not suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified; and
(c) he is not disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle.
(2) This section supersedes any provision to the contrary.

ADDENDUM B

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of
license.
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and,
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second conviction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation

or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been paid.
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility;
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a
prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by
the Department of Social Services.
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of alcohol
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with
the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of
conviction is based.

ADDENDUM C

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or
drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning,
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of
test available — Who may give test — Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44.
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any other
requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section.
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test
or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to
arrange for any specific test is not a defense to taking a test requested by
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests.
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or
any one or all of the tests requested, the person shall be warned by a
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the
test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor
vehicle. Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may be given. A peace officer shall serve on the person, on
behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. If the
officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division,
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the division. A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form
by the division, serve also as the temporary license. The peace officer
shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of the
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1).
(b) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the
hearing shall be made in writing, and within ten days after the date of
the arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division
shall notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practicable. If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing

before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall
be revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the
date of arrest.
(c) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the division, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held. The division
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under
Subsection 41-2-112(6), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative
costs. The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court
decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the
revocation was improper.
(d) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the division under this section may seek judicial review.
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person
resides.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or
tests shall be made available to him.
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19) who, at the direction of a peace officer,
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason
to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered
according to standard medical practice.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests
administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the
taking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug.

ADDENDUM D

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

63-46b-15

63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this
chapter.
History: C. 1953,63-46b-14, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, divided former
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and
(2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as
present Subsection (3); added "or is considered

to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b)" in Subsection (3); and made
minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 315 m a k e s the act effective on January 1,
1988.

ADDENDUM E

COURT OF APPEALS

78-2a-3

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(0 appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a)
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a);
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2Ka);
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision
of law" at the end of Subsection (2 Ka); inserted
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb) to (2Kh) as Subsections (2He) to
(2Hi); added "except those from the small
claims department of a circuit court" at the end

of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic
changes
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection
(2)(h) as Subsection (2Ki).
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(2Ha), rewrote the phrase before "except"
which had read "the final orders and decrees of
state and local agencies or appeals from the
district court review of them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other provision of law" at the
end of Subsection (2Ka); inserted present Subsection (2Kb); designated former Subsections
(2Kb) to (2Kh) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for
"first or capital degree felony" in present Subsection (2 Kf).

ADDENDUM F

U.S. Const, amend. V:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV:
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges of immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.

Utah Const, art. I, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.

Utah Const, art. I, § 24
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
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The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was administered
Results indicating 08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood
alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may,
result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle
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The following admonition was given by me to the subject
If you refuse the test it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you,refuse, your license or
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited driver's license
After you have taken this test you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer
a test at your own expense, in addition to the one I have requested you to submit to, so long as it does
not delay the test or tests requested by m i Upon-ycflur revest, JJ will make available to you the results
^ of the test if you take it J( j^J^A
^ J J h ^ J b ^ svJL*

I, $ * following admonition was given by me to the subject:
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which
is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you
the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure.
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test.
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with
no provision for a limited license.
J.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
Was subject advised of the following rights? y^s
When
^3i~/>
By Whom? A ^ " " ' *
^/y^K
*^
Where?
/fc 5 n
(S(- You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before
^
any questioning, if you wish one.
\^4. If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answering questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning.

£S

25
Cs£

J§

Were the following waiver questions asked?
Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you?
Response
\^X Mr 2. Having these rights in mind, do you wish to t^lk to us^now? J
f
Resppnse
T Z ^ s /*J*
f^~ **>• cs -JU^l
*& a j^usr AM^

Jyhi

(~&r+^J[u*^

f? /
±J ^

JO
f
^^/^^fr^

^ v / JlJLr<^> ";k™k JLA&& • •

INTERVIEW:
Were you operating a vehicle?
^UL^
Where were you going?
V (ij^u^^y\ . j*
What street or highway were you on?|_
j^UpT^ A<^*\
Direction of travel?
"^ * **
—
'
^
Where did you start from??
\kJ(jjj(^.
When?
Vy^
yJu.xr
WMat time is it now?
YU,^L<L.
ot/tcA
What is today's date?
v $1**- ^ •/'**<Day of week?
PK r a t.
/
(Actual time
Date
'/
"'
Day
f
What city or county are you in now?
Ai.c//ein^
/0^, 7 ^ ^
.
What were you doing during the last three hours? flw »v »«~j, ^ L A ^ f>\ tJla^ h/d (Uy Jn k ^^^

Have you been drinking?
-^ ,
What? AUMU M flj vr k t A L y ^ c. /Lfisj HoW much? > ^ ~ f
a frfiL
iti*'
Where? W f l > ^ ^ > i \ ^ i*
r ^ U n V
When did you have your first drink? \l/g>*y T w S i f o
Last drink? T i Q l WN. 5 ^L
Are j^ou under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now? '^s4
J

rfo^

j

J^r^K

sj>

£LCL

Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind?
(What kind? Get sample)
When did you have the last dose?
Are you ill?
A-Y-Q.
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:)
Were you involved in an accident today?
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident?
If so, what?
When?
How much?

A/.^_

^ H ^ ^ / TL

II.

OTHER
ER OCCURRENCES BR FApTS: f

T*fY

fy 7

II.

9

fa*+rw*+
i**r
'*i

1
ir*****
**

5V<.ne,
T

,

,

•> - ' *» W' c^f'

•

I

I

2" usc^Ayf ^f*-

r

WM-w—

j/

'***"

*

™**^

A

I

**lI

/

?*

/

J J

/c r- eve*

ATTACHED DOCUMENTS:
I have attached the following documents to this report:
1. % Copy of citation/temporary license
2. £J Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit
3. D Traffic accident report
4. IS Other documents (specify)

lereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer and that the information contained above in this report form and attached
xuments is true and correct to my knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my
jties. It is my belief the subject was in violation of section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time, and place specified in this report.

Signature of Peace Officer

J

Law Enforcement Agency:.
Date: S'S-V?

Tims: /<&£-

The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to:
Driver License Division
4501 South 2700 West
P.O. Box 30560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560

y

/

/

ADDENDUM H

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
BRUCE M. HALE (1298)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHERMAN L. RICHENS,
Plaintiff,

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

:

FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Director
and the Office of Driver
License Services, State of Utah,

:

Civil No.

:

Judge Dennis L. Draney

Respondent.

:

89-CV-66D

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court
being regularly scheduled for a trial de novo and the parties
being present and represented by counsel and the Court having
heard testimony and admitted exhibit one, the DUI report form,
and counsel for the plaintiff having stipulated to the necessary
facts leading to the arrest, that the driver was crossing the
center line of the street, dragging a chain on a trailer and was
followed to a service station, and having been stopped by the
police officer did not pass the field sobriety test, the Court
having taken testimony and being appraised in the premises makes
the following:

06 \

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the information testified and

stipulated to and the exhibit give sufficient facts to provide
the arresting officer with reasonable grounds to believe the
petitioner to have been driving or in actual physical control of
a vehicle in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44.

The plaintiff was slow in responding to the troopers

spotlight was violating the law by travelling in the wrong lane
of traffic, not having proper trailer lights and dragging a
chain, had the odor of alcohol, poor balance, watery and reddish
eyes, could not properly perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus
test, the walk and balance test, the turn test and the one leg
field sobriety test, and admitted to having had a couple drinks.
2.

The Court finds that the warnings in Roman Numeral

XX of Exhibit One adequately advised this driver and any
reasonable person that he must take the test requested by the
peace officer or suffer the consequences of a revoked or
suspended driving permit.

The second sentence of the second

admonition advised the individual driver that he may have a
physician of his own choice administer a test in "addition to the
one" requested by the peace officer.

The Court finds that

admonition was given to the plaintiff and that he knew or should
have understood the admonition and did refuse.

-2-

3.

The Court finds specifically in the total facts and

circumstances that the plaintiff was warned and refused to take
the breath test by his acts and actions.
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
now makes its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that

plaintiff having refused to take the breath test offered by the
officer, no blood test being offered and being reasonably warned
as required pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, that the
department's actions were not arbitrary or capricious and the
driver license division's order of revocation should be affirmed.
2.

The Court further concludes that the plaintiff was

properly and reasonably admonished and warned of the consequences
to his driver's permit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10
and that the peace officer is not required to specifically tell
the plaintiff that he has no other test options under Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1)(b) and (c). The DUI report form read to the
plaintiff adequately informed any reasonable driver that he did
not have the right to demand a test other than that offered by
that officer.
DATED this .3 j ' /, day of August, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEJ/
_§ighth District Judge
^

03")

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law was mailed, postage
prepaid, to Robert M. McRae, attorney for plaintiff, 209 East 100
North, Vernal, Utah

84078, this

t

day of August, 1989.

06h
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
BRUCE M. HALE (1298)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022

<•!
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHERMAN L. RICHENS,
Petitioner,

ORDER

v.
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Director
and the Office of Driver
License Services, State of Utah,

Civil No.

89-CV-66-D

Judge Dennis L. Draney

Respondent.
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court
and the Court having signed findings of fact and conclusions of
law on the August 28, 1989, and the Petitioner having requested a
ruling on his Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and the Court having reviewed the transcript of the trial,
exhibits and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well
as the stipulations and proffers made by the parties and the
Court on its own motion having entered a minute entry ruling on
October 18, 1989, pursuant to Rule 4-501 and 504 of the Code of
Judicial Administration, as well as Rule 12(cL ^nd 54 of XAi& Utah
Rules Civil Procedure, this matter is:
j J

K

\

no'
L. w

04

ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

The petition is denied and the Utah driving permit

is to be revoked by the Department of Public Safety, Driver
License Division, as required by the Utah Implied Consent Law.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10.
DATED this

day of Qetefeer, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEY
Eighth District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Order, was mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert M. McRae,
attorney for plaintiff, 209 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah
this

84078,

^ - day of October, 1989.

i)i\>

ADDENDUM J

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SHERMAN L. RICHENS r

)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF,

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIP r
OF HEARING

VS
FRED SCHWENDIMAN, DIRECTOR
)
OF DRIVERS LICENSE, STATE OF )
UTAH..
)
)
DEFENDANT.
)
)

CIVIL NO.

89-CV-66-D

BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 17TH DAY OF JULY,
1989, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 11:30 A.M., THE ABOVEENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEAPING IN THE DISTRICT
COURTROOM OF THE DUCHESNE COUNTY COURTHOUSE, DUCHESNE,
UTAH: SAID CAUSE BEING HEARD BY THE HONORABLE DENNIS L.
DRANEY, JUDGE IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF
UTAH.

*

*

*

ORIGINAL

FILED
JAN 1 6 1553
COURT OF APPEALS

052

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

ROBERT M. MC RAE, ESQ,
MC RAE & DELAND
209 EAST 100 NORTH
VERNAL, UTAH 84078

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

BRUCE HALE, ESQ.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 STATE CAPITAL BLDG.
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114

I N D E X
FOR THE

DEFENDANT

PG (S)

MERVIN GUSTIN
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HALE
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. MC RAE
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HALE
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. MC RAE

7
13
15
16

KATHLEEN HARRISON
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR

18

HALE

f- 053

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

THE RECORD WILL

REFLECT

ON RICHENS V S . SCHWENDIMAN THAT MR. RICHENS IS NOT
PRESENT.

I ASSUME THAT'S AT HIS ELECTION, MR. MC RAE?
MR. MC RAE:

I PRESUME IT'S HIS

ELECTION

BECAUSE HE WASN'T NOTIFIED, BUT HE DOESN'T NEED TO BE
HERE
MR. HALE:
THE COURT:
NOTICED.

HE WAS NOT NOTIFIED OR HE WAS?
WELL. HIS COUNSEL OBVIOUSLY WAS

COUNSEL IS HERE.
MR. HALE:
THE COURT:

SO YOU MAY PROCEED MR. HALE.

CALL TROOPER MERV GUSTIN.
TROOPER,. WOULD YOU COME FORWARD AND

BE SWORN.. PLEASE.
MR. MC RAE:

YOUR HONOR, I'M

PREPARED TO

STIPULATE TO THE FACTS LEADING UP TO THE CONFRONTATION.
MR. GUSTIN WAS THE OFFICER, AND BASICALLY THOSE FACTS.
I REVIEWED THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE REFUSAL

HEARING.

BASICALLY THOSE FACTS ARE THAT TROOPER GUSTIN WAS
WESTBOUND ON HIGHWAY 40 OVER EAST OF THE

STRAWBERRY

RIVER HERE AND HE OBSERVED A PICKUP TRUCK AND A TRAILER
HAULING GOLF CARTS.

AT LEAST THE TRAILER PART WAS

PERIODICALLY ACROSS THE CENTER DIVIDING LINE.

THAT

PROMPTED HIM TO TURN AROUND AND FOLLOW THE TRUCK

AND

TRAILER, AND HE NOTICED THERE WAS A TAILLIGHT OUT ON THE

054
COMPUTER ASSISTED

TRANSCRIPT
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1

TRAILER.

HE TURNED ON HIS RED SPOTLIGHT AND

2

THE TRAILER, WHICH DIDN'T STOP IMMEDIATELY, BUT FOLLOWED

3

THE TRAILER

4

FROSTOP.

5

WHO WAS PUMPING GAS INTO THE PICKUP TRUCK.

6

THEREAFTER

7

OFFICER'S SATISFACTION HE DID NOT PASS.

8

TOOK HIM TO THE JAIL HERE IN DUCHESNE FOR THE PURPOSE OF

y

GIVING HIM AN INTOXILYZER TEST.

INTO THE CONOCO STATION OVER HERE BY THE

AT THAT POINT HE CONFRONTED THE

PETITIONER.

THEREAFTER

MR. HALE:

1J

MR MC RAE:

15
16
17

STATED

HE

WHAT

THE TESTIMONY WOULD BE:5

12

14

AND

PERFORMED CERTAIN FIELD TESTS, WHICH TO THE

SO FAR, BRUCE, HAVE I REASONABLY
ii

FOLLOWED

YES.
UP TO THAT POINT, THEN IF BRUCE HAS

QUESTIONS FOR THE TROOPER.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

WILL THAT

STIPULATION

BE SUFFICIENT FOR YOUR PURPOSES, MR. HALEr>
MR. HALE:

NOT ENTIRELY, YOUR HONOR.

I WOULD

18

LIKE TO ASK MR. MC RAE, I ASSUME THEN WE ARE

iy

THAT THE SOLE ISSUE IS WHETHER OR NOT WE HAVE A PROPER

20

REFUSAL OR NOT UNDER THE

21

MR. MC RAE:

22

MR. HALE:

23
24
25

STIPULATING

STATUTE?

THAT'S CORRECT.
AND WE DO NOT HAVE TO GO INTO THE

UNDER THE INFLUENCE AND THE REST OF IT?
THE COURT:

EXCUSE ME, BUT THE PETITION ALSO

CLAIMS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE.

-05£
roMPUTER

ASSISTED

TRANSCRIPT

MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

THAT IS CORRECT.
DO YOU WANT ME TO DECIDE THAT AS

WELL?
MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

YES.
DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER TESTIMONY OR

EVIDENCE ON THAT POINT, COUNSEL.
MR. HALE:
TO THAT

WELL, YES.

IF HE IS NOT

ISSUE I WOULD LIKE THE COURT TO HEAR

STIPULATING
TESTIMONY

REGARDING THAT.
THE COURT:
MR. MC RAE:
TEST TO THE

ALL RIGHT.
I SAID HE DID NOT PASS THE FIELD

OFFICER'S SATISFACTION.

THE COURT:

THE QUESTION I• M ASKING

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TH E STOP

ITSELF.

IS THE

FOR THE OFFICER

TO

FOLLOW HIM BACK TO TOWN AND -MR. MC RAE:

THAT PROBABILITY, YOUR HONOR, I

THINK !IF CORRECTLY STATED IS THAT HE OBSERVED AT LEAST
THE TRAILER PORTION OF THE VEHICLE CROSSING THE DIVIDING
LINE.

THAT IS; WHAT PRECIPITATED

HIM TO TURN AROUND AND

FOLLOW AND TURN ON HIS RED LIGHT AND THEN CONFRONT THE
DRIVER AT THE CONOCO STATION.
THE COURT:
THAT I 1 M ASSUMING

IF YOU HAVE NO OTHER TESTIMONY ON

YOU ARE STIPULATING THAT IS WHAT MR.

GUSTIN WOULD TESTIFY TO THEN I f M GOING TO FIND THAT IN
FACT THERE WAS> PROBABLE CAUSE.

0,
COMPUTER ASSISTED

TRANSCRIPT

5

MR. HALE:

WE WOULD PROFFER

IF CALLED TO

TESTIFY, YOUR HONOR, THAT TROOPER GUSTIN WOULD

TESTIFY

THAT HE OBSERVED A TRAFFIC OFFENSE BEFORE HE APPROACHED
THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE,
THE COURT:
MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:
MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

LET'S MAKE THE RECORD.
I'LL

STIPULATE TO THAT,

THAT HE OBSERVED A TRAFFIC

OFFENSE?

YES
ON THAT BASIS I'M GOING TO FIND HE

HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO MAKE THE STOP.
MR. MC RAE:

WELL. PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONFRONT

THE DRIVER.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

THAT'S RIGHT.

YOU DID SAY THAT HE IN FACT DID TURN ON HIS RED
MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

THOUGH
LIGHT?

YES
WELL, WHEN IT WAS -- I CONSIDER

THAT A STOP, AND HE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO DO SO.
MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.
NOW THEN, MR. HALE, YOU MAY ELICIT

SUCH TESTIMONY THAT IS AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE OTHER
INFORMATION.
MR. HALE;

WE ARE STILL STIPULATING THAT THE

ISSUE IS WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A PROPER REFUSAL UNDER
THE

STATUTE?
MR. MC RAE:

THAT'S CORRECT.

05V
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MERVIN

GUSTIN,

CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT,
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS
FOLLOWS:

DIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. HALE
Q.

WOULD YOU TELL THE COURT YOUR NAME AND

EMPLOYMENT,
A.

PLEASE?

MERVIN GUSTIN.

TROOPER WITH THE UTAH

HIGHWAY

PATROL.
O.

I SHOW YOU A THREE-PAGE DOCUMENT ENTITLED

SUMMONS AND CITATION AND DUI REPORT FORM.

DUI

IT BEARS THE

DATE OF 5/5/89, THE FACTS ABOUT A DRIVING PATTERN THAT
MR. MC RAE HAS REITERATED, MR. RICHENS* NAME AND YOUR
SIGNATURE.

IT INDICATES THAT HE WAS ARRESTED AT THE

HOUR OF 23:30 MILITARY TIME, FOR DRIVING WHILE UNDER
INFLUENCE, AFTER FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS AND

THE

OBSERVATIONS

BY YOU AND ADMISSIONS -- PRE-ARREST ADMISSIONS BY HIM.
DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT DOCUMENT,
THE COURT:
MR. HALE:

PLEASE?

DO YOU HAVE THAT
YES.

MARKED?

IT'S EXHIBIT 1, YOUR

HONOR.

DEFENDANT'S.
THE WITNESS:

YES, I DO.

THAT IS THE FORM I

058
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FILED OUT FOR MR. RICHENS.
Q.

(BY MR. HALE)

THAT'S THE DRIVER'S LICENSE NCA

COPY THAT YOU SUBMITTED TO YOUR DRIVER'S

LICENSE

DIVISION?
A.

YES, IT IS

Q.

AND IS THAT IN YOUR OWN

A.

YES, IT IS.

O.

IS THAT THE DOCUMENT YOU ARE REQUIRED BY LAW TO

FILL OUT AND

HANDWRITING?

SUBMIT?

YES, IT IS.
Q.

AND DID YOU APPEAR AT A HEARING BEFORE THE

DEPARTMENT AND GIVE TESTIMONY REGARDING THIS EVENT?
A.

YES.. I DID.

Q.

AND MR. MC RAE WAS PRESENT; IS THAT CORRECT?

A.

THAT'S

O.

AND YOU GAVE TESTIMONY UNDER

A.

I DID.

O.

AND IS THAT —

CORRECT
OATH?

DOES THAT DOCUMENT

ACCURATELY

REFLECT YOUR RECOLLECTION AT THE TIME THAT YOU

PREPARED

IT?
YES, IT DOES.
O.

DID YOU PREPARE THAT CONTEMPORANEOUS, MEANING

ABOUT THE TIME OF THE THE STOP AND THE ARREST?
A.

YES, I DID.
MR. HALE:

WE WOULD MOVE TO ADMIT IT, PLEASE

05b
COMPUTER ASSISTED
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MR. MC RAE:

NO OBJECTION

THE COURT:
Q.

EXHIBIT 1 IS RECEIVED.

(BY MR. HALE)

NOW, THAT DOCUMENT, UNDER

SECTION 10, TROOPER THERE IS A SECTION ON —
CHEMICAL TESTS.

SUB-

ENTITLED

DID YOU FOLLOW THE SEQUENCE OF THAT

SUBSECTION IN MAKING A REQUEST OF MR. RICHENS THAT HE
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL

TEST?

A.

YES, I DID,

Q.

WOULD YOU TELL THE COURT WHAT YOU DID AND WHAT

THE RESPONSES WERE, IF ANY?
A.

WELL, I SAID, "MR. RICHENS, DO YOU

THAT YOU ARE UNDER ARREST FOR DRIVING UNDER

UNDERSTAND
THE

INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL? 1 '
HIS RESPONSE WAS, "YUP."
O.

NOW, WHERE WERE YOU LOCATED WHEN YOU SAID THAT,

AND HE RESPONDED
A.

IN WHAT MANNER?

I WAS STANDING IN THE AREA WHERE THE

INTOXILYZER MACHINE IS.

RIGHT TO THE SIDE OF IT.

THAT'S THE AREA WE KIND OF USE AS A BOOKING AREA AT THE
DUCHESNE COUNTY JAIL.
O.

ALL RIGHT.

AND WHO WAS

PRESENT?

A.

THE JAILER, NED FILLINGIM, WAS PRESENT THERE AT

THAT TIME.
O.

AND YOU AND MR. RICHENS?
YES

UoU
COMPUTER ASSISTED
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Q.

AND THEN DID YOU GO ON AND READ FROM THIS

REPORT AS IS INDICATED?
A.

YES, I DID.

Q.

WHICH TEST DID YOU REQUEST THAT HE TAKE?

A.

I REQUESTED THAT HE TAKE A BREATH TEST.

Q-

AND WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE TO YOUR

A.

HE SAID,

Q-

NOW, DID YOU FOLLOW THE SEQUENCE AS

n

NOPE.

REQUEST?

BLOOD TEST O N L Y . n
INDICATED

ON THAT FORM?
A.

YES, I DID.

Q.

AFTER MAKING THAT STATEMENT WHAT DID YOU DO OR

SAY, IF ANYTHING?
A.

I GAVE HIM THE FIRST ADMONITION THERE.

WANT ME TO READ THAT
Q.

NO.

DO YOU

ADMONITION?

THE REPORT IS IN.

THEN AFTER READING THAT YOU AGAIN MADE ANOTHER
REQUEST THAT HE TAKE THE TEST; IS THAT

CORRECT?

A.

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q.

DID YOU OFFER A BLOOD TEST TO HIM?

A.

NO.

Q-

AND WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE AT THAT

A.

HE SAYS, "MY REQUEST IS THAT I WANT MY DOCTOR

I DID NOT.
PARTICULAR

TIME?

HERE TO PULL A BLOOD TEST ONLY."
Q-

OKAY.

WHAT WAS YOUR RESPONSE, IF ANY, TO THAT?

061
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A.

I GAVE HIM THE SECOND ADMONITION.

Q.

AND AFTER THAT DID YOU AGAIN REQUEST THAT HE

TAKE THE BREATH TEST?
A

*

NO.

I DID NOT.

Q.

WHAT DID YOU DO?

A.

HE JUST TOLD ME HE WANTED A BLOOD TEST ONLY,

AND THAT WAS THAT.

Q.

OKAY.

IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE HIM DID YOU

IF THERE MIGHT BE A TECHNICIAN

PRESENT?

A.

YES, I DID.

Q.

WAS THERE ONE AVAILABLE OR NOT?

A.

NO.

THERE WAS NOT.

SEE

HE WAS INFORMED HE WAS

GONE FOR THE WEEKEND.

Q.

BUT IN ANY EVENT HAD YOU OFFERED A BLOOD TEST

TO HIM?
A.

NO.

I HAD NOT.

Q.

SO WHO BROUGHT UP THE WORD BLOOD, YOU OR HE?

A.

MR. RICHENS DID.

MR. RICHENS DID.

I NEVER

MENTIONED BLOOD TO HIM.

Q.

DID YOU TELL HIM OR READ TO HIM THE

LANGUAGE

FROM THE REPORT FORM THAT IF HE DID NOT TAKE THAT TEST
HE WOULD LOSE HIS LICENSE FOR A YEAR?
MR. MC RAE:

I OBJECT.

THE REPORT SPEAKS FOR

ITSELF.
THE WITNESS:

THAT'S THE SECOND ADMONITION.. AND

062
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I READ THAT SECOND ADMONITION TO HIM.
THE COURT:

Q.

1

THE OBJECTION IS OVERRULED.

(BY MR. HALE)

WELL, DID YOU WARN HIM HE COULD

LOSE HIS LICENSE?
A.

YES, I DID.

Q.

ALL RIGHT.

AND HOW DID HE RESPOND TO THAT

WARNING?
A.

HE SAID HE WANTED A BLOOD TEST ONLY.

Q.

HE USED THE WORD ONLY?

A.

YES .

Q-

SO THE WORDING THAT YOU HAVE WRITTEN ON YOUR

REPORT IS A DIRECT QUOTE, IS IT NOT?
A.

IT IS.

Q-

DID HE EVER REQUEST THE BREATH TEST FROM YOU

THAT YOU HAD

OFFERED?

A.

NO.

HE DID NOT.

Q.

DID YOU SPEND SOME AMOUNT OF TIME THERE IN THE

JAIL WHERE HE COULD HAVE OR MIGHT HAVE DONE THAT?
A.

YES, I DID.

Q.

APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH TIME?

A.

HALF HOUR; 45 MINUTES.

HE CALLED A FRIEND TO

COME DOWN AND PICK HIM UP AT THE JAIL, AND I WAS
ALL THAT TIME AND THE TIME UNTIL THEY FINISHED

THERE

BOOKING

HIM.
MR. HALE:

ALL RIGHT.
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THE COURT:

YOU MAY CROSS-EXAMINE, MR. MC RAE.

MR. MC RAE:

THANK YOU.

CROSS

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MC RAE:
TROOPER, WOULD YOU HAND THAT DOCUMENT TO THE
JUDGE, PLEASE, EXHIBIT 1.
AND IS IT OPEN, YOUR HONOR, TO ROMAN NUMERAL
CHEMICAL

TEST?
THE COURT:

Q.

10

YES

(BY MR. MC RAE)

ALL RIGHT, TROOPER.

I'M

SURE

YOU HAVE FILLED OUT SEVERAL OF THESE IN YOUR CAREER: IS
THAT

CORRECT?
THAT'S CORRECT.
Q.

OUT,

H

UNDER ROMAN NUMERAL TEN YOU HAVE -- IT STARTS

T H E FOLLOWING ADMONITION WAS GIVEN BY ME TO THE

SUBJECT," ET CETERA.

YOU READ HIM THAT?

Y E S , I DID.
Q.

TO WHICH HE RESPONDED HE WANTED A BLOOD TEST

ONLY; IS THAT
A.

CORRECT?

THAT'S CORRECT.

HE SAID HE WANTED HIS DOCTOR

THERE TO PULL IT,
Q.

AND THEN YOU READ THE SECOND

ADMONITION

STARTING OUT AT THE BOTTOM OF THAT PAGE, "IF YOU REFUSE
THE TEST, IT WILL NOT BE GIVEN.

HOWEVER, I MUST
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WARN YOU, " ET CETERA; IS THAT CORRECT?

1

A.

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q.

NOW, AT THE HEARING THAT WAS CONDUCTED IN THIS

CASE BEFORE THE DRIVER'S LICENSE BUREAU ON

l H K 5 OF JUNE

1989 , DO YOU RECALL TESTIFYING UNDER OATH THAT THOSE
WERE THE ONLY TWO STATEMENTS AND ADMONITIONS GIVEN TO
THE DRIVER; IS THAT CORRECT?
A.

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q.

AT ANY TIME, TROOPER, DID YOU EVER TELL THIS

DRIVER THAT UNDER THE PROVISION OF 41-6-44.10 UCA, AS
AMENDED, THAT YOU HAD THE SOLE, EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE TO
DETERMINE WHICH TEST YOU CHOOSE TO GIVE, AND THAT HE HAD
NO CHOICE OF WHAT TESTS THAT HE WANTED TO HAVE, AND I
BELIEVE YOUR ANSWER WAS NO; IS THAT CORRECT?
A.

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q-

AND SO WE HAVE A DRIVER WHO BY STATUTE THERE

ARE 'rHREE VALID TESTS, BLOOD, BREATH AND URINE, RIGHT?
A.

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q.

AND WE HAVE A DRIVER WHO HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD

THAT YOU GET THE FIRST VOTE ON WHICH TEST, AND THEN UNDER
THE SECOND ADMONITION HE CAN HAVE A TEST OF HIS CHOOSING
IN ADDITION TO YOUR TEST; IS THAT CORRECT?
A.

THAT'S CORRECT.

HE KNEW THAT I REQUESTED

HIM

TO TAKE A BREATH TEST.
Q.

BUT YOU NEVER TOLD HIM THAT THAT WAS YOUR

SOLE
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PREROGATIVE AS TO WHICH TEST YOU CHOSE TO GIVE, AND THEN
HE COULD HAVE ANY OF THE OTHERS IF HE WANTED THEM,

RIGHT?

A.

I DIDN'T TELL HIM THAT, NO.

Q.

AND THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT NIELS NIELSEN SAID THE

CODE SPECIFICALLY

STATES, THAT THE OFFICER WILL PICK THE

TEST WHICH WILL BE GIVEN.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DRIVERS

ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD THAT, I WOULDN'T VENTURE A GUESS.
THINK SOME DO AND SOME DON'T.

IS THAT A FAIR

I

STATEMENT

OF THE FACTS?
MR. HALE:
HONOR.

OBJECT.

ASK IT BE STRICKEN, YOUR

AND HE IS OFFERING TESTIMONY OF A HEARING

EXAMINER THAT'S NOT RELEVANT.
THE COURT:
MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.
MR. HALE?

REDIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. HALE:
O.
OF AN

TROOPER, WAS THERE ANY NEED TO GIVE THAT KIND

EXPLANATION?
MR. MC RAE:

I WILL OBJECT TO THAT BECAUSE THIS

IS THE SUBJECTIVE OPINION OF THIS OFFICER, WHICH I CAN
CALL A HUNDRED OFFICERS AND COME UP WITH A HUNDRED
VARIOUS OBJECTIVE OPINIONS.
MR. HALE:

LET ME REPHRASE THE QUESTION.
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THE COURT:

THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED.

YOU

MAY REPHRASE THE QUESTION.
Q-

(BY MR. HALE)

WAS THERE ANYTHING THAT HAPPENED

THAT INDICATED TO YOU THAT HE WAS CONFUSED AS TO THE
FACT THAT YOU WERE OFFERING HIM ONLY A HKF.ATH TEST AND
NOT A BLOOD TEST?

A.

ABSOLUTELY NOT.

Q.

DID HE SAY OR DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD

INDICATE

THAT y
A.

NO.

HE DID NOT.

MR. HALE:

THANK YOU.

RECRQSS

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MC RAE:

Q.

BUT JUST TO KEEP THE RECORD CLEAR, BECAUSE IN.

THE EVENT OF AN ADVERSE RULING THE COURT REPORTER
HEREWITH REQUESTED TO IMMEDIATELY TRANSCRIBE
PROCEEDING.

IS

THIS

BUT TO MAKE THINGS CLEAR, YOU NEVER TOLD THE

DRIVER THAT UNDER THE LAW YOU HAD THE EXCLUSIVE

FIRST

VOTE RIGHT AS TO WHICH TEST HE WAS GOING TO TAKE?
A.

IN THOSE WORDS I DIDN'T TELL HIM, BUT THAT IS

IMPLIED IN THE ADMONITION THERE.

I'M REQUESTING HIM TO

TAKE THAT TEST.
Q.

BUT IN THAT ADMONITION

IT NEVER SAYS THAT IF HE

DOESN'T TAKE THAT TEST THAT CONSTITUTES A REFUSAL,
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THE COURT:

WOULD YOU COME FORWARD AND BE

SWORN.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST IN EXPEDITING
CASE, MR. MC RAE.

THE

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THE TESTIMONY.

KATHLEEN

HARRISON,

CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT,
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS
FOLLOWS:

DIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. HALE:
Q.

YOUR NAME AND EMPLOYMENT.. PLEASE?

A.

MY NAME IS KATHLEEN HARRISON.

I'M EMPLOYED AS

A JAILER AT THE DUCHESNE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT.
O.

AND YOU HAD A CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHENS

AFTER HE HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO TAKE A TEST BY THE
TROOPER, RESPECTING THAT TEST, DID YOU NOT?
THE COURT:

EXCUSE M E , MR. HALE, BUT I'M

SURE THAT THE RECORD REFLECTS THAT MRS. HARRISON

NOT

WAS

HERE TO HAVE ANY BASIS FOR WHAT YOU HAVE NOW ASKED HER
TO TESTIFY TO.

PERHAPS WE COULD --

MR. HALE:

I INTENDED MY QUESTION TO BE A

PRELIMINARY, FOUNDATIONAL
Q.

(BY MR. HALE)

QUESTION.
DID YOU HAVE SUCH A CONVER-
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SATION?
A.

YES
WERE YOU PRESENT IN THE JAIL THE EVENING THAT

HE WAS ARRESTED AND

RELEASED?

A.

Y E S , SIR.

Q.

AND

A.

LET ME CLARIFY.

ON DUTY.
Q.

AFTER HE WAS ARRESTED I CAME

HE WAS JUST ABOUT READY TO BE BONDED AND
OKAY.

LEAVE

SO YOU WERE PRESENT WHEN HE WAS THERE

LEAVING THE JAIL; IS THAT CORRECT?
CORRECT.
Q.

AND DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH TIME HAD EXPIRED

SINCE

HE HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO TAKE THE TEST?
A.

NO.

Q.

OKAY.

1 DON'T,
AND DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION

PERSONALLY WITH MR RICHENS REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT HE
SHOULD TAKE THE TROOPER'S TEST OR NOT?

WAS

A.

I DID,

Q.

TELL THE COURT WHO THE PARTIES WERE AND WHAT

SAID?
A.

MYSELF AND SHERM WERE IN THE HALL.

I JUST COME

ON DUTY AND I SAID, "WHAT ARE WE DOING HERE TODAY,
SHERM?"
AND HE SAYS -- YOU KNOW -- MORE OR LESS TOLD ME
HE HAD BEEN PICKED UP FOR DUI AND STUFF.

AND

SOMEBODY
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PRIOR TOLD ME THAT HE HAD REFUSED TO BLOW.

TO TAKE THE

BREATH TEST.
AND I ASKED HIM ABOUT IT.
REFUSING?

"HOW COME YOU ARE

YOU ARE GOING TO LOSE YOUR LICENSE A FULL

YEAR.
Q.

DID YOU USE THE WORD BREATH

TEST?

A.

I THINK I USED THE WORD BLOW.

Q.

OKAY.

A.

YES

Q.

WHAT DID HE SAY?

A.

HE SAID, "I'M NOT GOING TO BLOW."

O.

NOW.. YOU DIDN'T TAKE ANY NOTES?

A.

NO .

Q.

BUT

AND TO THAT QUESTION DID HE RESPOND?

—

OFFHANDED CONVERSATION. YES.
BUT YOU REMEMBER THAT HE SAID THAT TO YOU?
A.

YES

Q.

DID HE MAKE ANY —

THEN DID YOU MAKE ANY

EXPLANATIONS TO HIM?
A.

YES.

I SAID, "WHY NOT?"

I SAID, "YOU ARE

GOING TO LOSE YOUR LICENSE FOR A FULL YEAR."
AND HE SAID, "THEY CAN'T TAKE MY LICENSE.

THEY

HAVEN'T FOUND ME GUILTY."
AND I SAID, "YES, THEY CAN.

YOU FORFEIT YOUR

LICENSE WHEN YOU REFUSE YOUR TEST."
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AND HE SAYS, "I'LL FIGHT THEM. H
AND IT WAS JUST MORE OR LESS END OF CONVERSATION.

Q.

ALL RIGHT.

AND WAS

THIS BEFORE OR AFTER HE HAD

BEEN BONDED OR BAILED OUT, DO YOU KNOW?
A.

THE GAL CAME AND GOT HIM —

WAS WALKING THROUGH THE DOOR
SATION

Q-

COME TO GET HIM,

JUST ABOUT AS THE CONVER-

ENDED, TO MY RECOLLECTION.
WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE HIS DEMEANOR AND

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BREATH TEST AT THAT PARTICULAR
A.
IT.

TIME ?

THAT IT WASN'T -- HE JUST WASN 1 T GOING TO DO

IT WAS UNNECESSARY.
MR. HALE:
MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

THANK YOU.
NO QUESTIONS.
YOU MAY

STEP DOWN, MRS . HARRISON.

ANY OTHER WITI JESSES, MR. HALE?
MR. HALE:
THE COURT:

NO, SIR.
MR. MC RAE, DO YOU HAVE ANY

QUESTIONS •
MR. MC RAE:

NONE, YOUR HONOR.

TO THE RECORDS SET FORTH IF THE

BUT IN ADDITI ON

PETITION , I WILL REFER

THE COURT TO THE PROVISIONS -- DOES THE COURT HAVE A
COPY OF THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION,

I GUESS

WOULD BE MORE PROPER?
THE COURT:

I DO NOT.
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MR. MC RAE:
MR. HALE:
RELEVANT.

DO YOU HAVE AN EXTRA
YES, I DO.

COPY , BRUCE?

BUT I DON'T SEE HOW IT'S

THIS IS A TRIAL DE NOVO AND WE STIPULATED AS

TO WHAT THE ISSUE IS, YOUR
THE COURT:
MR. MC RAE:

HONOR.

WHAT IS ITS RELEVANCE, MR. MC RAE?
IF YOU HAVE AN EXTRA COPY I ' LL

POINT IT OUT TO THE COURT.
MR. HALE:

I AM HANDING THE COURT NOW, STAPLED

TO A COPY OF THE COMPUTER

PRINTOUT OF THE DRIVER ' S

RECORD WHAT CONSTITUTES THE BALANCE OF THE

DEPARTMENT'S

FILE.
MR. MC RAE:

DOES IT CONTAIN A COPY OF THE

ORDER?
MR. HALE:

IT CONTAINS A COPY OF THE ORDER.

I

WILL LOCATE THAT.
MR. MC RAE:
MR. HALE:

THAT'S REALLY ALL I CARE ABOUT.
YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THE ORDER

THAT ' S MAILED OUT?
MR. MC RAE:
MR. HALE:
THE COURT:

RIGHT.

LET ME EXTRACT THAT.

WITH MY OBJECTION.
YOUR OBJECTION IS NOTED.

WE WILL

SEE IF MR. MC RAE CANf OVERCOME YOUR CONCERN AND THE
COURT* S CONCERN ABOUT ITS RELEVANCE.
MR. MC RAE:

DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT -•- EXHIBIT 2 BEING

RECEIVED BY THE

<m
(
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COURT?
MR. HALE:

OBJECT TO ITS MATERIALITY.

THE COURT:

WILL YOU ADDRESS ITS MATERIALITY?

MR. MC RAE :

I WILL, YOUR HONOR.

I WANT TO

MAKE A NICE, CLEAN RECORD.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, YOUR HONOR, PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF 63 DASH 46 SMALL B DASH 5 PAREN 1 CLOSE
PAREN SMALL I PAREN TWO SMALL I'S —
THIS .

I SUBMIT THAT UNDER

I DIDN'T NUMBER

THE ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

SECTION OF THE CODE THAT THE ORDER OF REVOCATION
AS A MATTER OF LAW.

I'LL

IS VOID

SUBMIT THE MATTER TO THE

COURT. YOU KNOW MY POSITION AS TO WHY WE ARE HERE.
MR. HALE:
ADMITTED, YOUR
HERETOFORE

MOVE THAT THE EXHIBIT NOT BE

HONOR , BASED ON THE

STIPULATIONS

ENTERED.
THE COURT:

EXHIBIT 2 IS NOT ADMITTED.
BUT MAY BE RETAINED AS PART OF THE

MR. MC RAE :
RECORD?

NO.

THE COURT:

WHEN IT'S NOT ADMITTED

I'M

RETURNING IT 'ro MR. HALE.
MR. MC RAE :

I WOULD LIKE IT MADE PART OF THE

RECORD, YOUR ]HONOR, BECAUSE IF YOU ADVERSELY RULE
AGAINST ME IT WILL BE A MATERIAL POINT ON APPEAL.
MR. HALE:
THE COURT:

SAME OBJECTION AND SAME OBSERVATION.
I'M GOING TO RETURN IT ON THE BASIS
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THAT IT IS

IMMATERIAL TO THE MATTERS PENDING BEFORE THE

COURT.
DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER ARGUMENT, MR. MC RAE?
MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

NO, YOUR

HONOR.

IT APPEARS, MR. MC RAE, TO THE

COURT THAT YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE PROCEEDINGS IS THAT
THE OFFICER DID NOT TELL MR. RICHENS THAT HE, THAT IS
THE OFFICER, HAD THE CHOICE OF WHICH TEST WOULD BE
REQUIRED; IS THAT

CORRECT?

MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

AMONG OTHER THINGS.
I UNDERSTAND, BUT THAT'S THE

POINT

THAT YOU MADE WHEN MR. GUSTIN WAS ON THE STAND.
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PROVISIONS AND
ADMONITIONS OF

SECTION 10 ADEQUATELY ADVISE THE DRIVER.

MR. MC RAE:

YOU MEAN ROMAN NUMERAL TEN, JUST

TO KEEP THE RECORD VERY CLEAR?
THE COURT:

THAT'S CORRECT.

ADEQUATELY

ADVISE

DRIVERS IN GENERAL AND A REASONABLE PERSON, AS WE ASSUME
MR. RICHENS TO BE, THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE CHOICE AS TO
WHICH TEST HE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE.
IN THE SECOND

HE IS ADVISED

SENTENCE OF THE SECOND ADMONITION

THAT

AFTER HE HAS TAKEN THE TEST REOUESTED BY THE OFFICER
WOULD BE PERMITTED TO HAVE A PHYSICIAN OF HIS OWN

HE

CHOICE

ADMINISTER A TEST AT HIS OWN EXPENSE IN ADDITION TO THE
ONE THAT WAS

REQUESTED BY THE OFFICER.
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CONSIDERING ALL OF THE ADMONITIONS AND THE

1

LANGUAGE OF SECTION 10, THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS
IN FACT A REFUSAL BY MR. RICHENS TO THE EXTENT THAT -BEYOND THAT WHICH WAS PERMITTED BY LAW, AND THAT THE
REVOCATION BASED ON THAT REFUSAL WAS NOT ARBITRARY
CAPRICIOUS.

NOR

YOUR NEXT POINT, MR. MC RAE.

MR. MC RAE:
THE COURT:

YOU ARE MAKING THE RECORD, JUDGE.
DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER POINT THAT YOU

WISH TO MAKE.
MR. MC RAE:

I HAD A SECOND POINT THAT I WISHED

TO MAKE, BUT YOU REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE EXHIBIT OR EVEN
HOLD THE EXHIBIT AS A TENDERED EXHIBIT PENDING APPEAL.
THE COURT:

VERY WELL.

THE ORDER OF THE

DRIVER'S LICENSE DIVISION REVOKING THE LICENSE OF MR.
RICHENS IS AFFIRMED.

I GUESS THAT'S WHAT WE DO WITH

THEM, MR. HALE, ON A 'rRlAL DE NOVO.

IN ANY EVENT 1 FIND

IT IS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND THAT WILL GIVE
YOU WHAT YOU NEED.
MR. HALE:
YOUR HONOR.

rHAT'S ALWAYS BEEN THE PROCEDURE,

YOU DO GIVE A TRIAL DE NOVO ON THE

HEARD BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT
THE COURT:

ISSUES

BELOW.

ALL RIGHT.

NOW, MR. MC RAE, IN KEEPING WITH YOUR
DETERMINED EFFORTS TO MAKE SURE THE RECORD IS CLEAR, I
WANT THE RECORD TO BE CLEAR THAT A TRANSCRIPT IS
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OBTAINED AFTER A MOTION IS MADE AND THE FEES ARE PAID IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE REPORTER, NOT BY
A STATEMENT MADE ON THE RECORD DURING TRISAL.
MR. MC RAE:

I'M AWARE OF THAT, YOUR

(WHEREUPON THIS HEARING WAS

*

HONOR.

CONCLUDED.)

* *
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I, MILO N. HARMON, RPR, OFFICIAL

COURT
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UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND
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